Game Theoretic and
Economic Models in IT
Game Theory and Economic
Models in IT
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Recent progress in theory for diverse
game contexts |
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repeated/finite, sustaining efficiency
and cooperation, auctions, bargaining and negotiation, incomplete/imperfect
information. |
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Becoming standard language for decision
making: economics, sociology. Recent Nobel prize for Nash. |
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Networks: |
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QoS: Service and resource pricing games
for better QoS provisioning, congestion control. Current research activity. |
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Denial of Service: Uncertainty in
opponents, actions. Game approach to design monitoring and enforcement,
balance costs and risks. |
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Logistics - recent successes |
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Physician Resident Matching program
(preference matching) |
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Cal power exchange (Dutch auctions) |
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Explore application to DOD scenarios |
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Collaborative reasoning, negotiation. |
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Embed game theoretic tools in
agents/decision aids; group decisions. |
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From
Heisenberg vs Bohr
to
Picard vs Q:
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New Challenges for Game Theory and
National Security |
US Defense Policy: 3
Goals
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Strengthen the bond of trust between
the American people and those who wear our nation’s uniform. We’ll give them
the tools they need and the respect they deserve. |
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We will work to defend our people and
our allies against growing threats: the threats of missiles; information
warfare; the threats of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. We will
confront the new threats of a new century. |
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We will begin creating the military of
the future, one that takes full advantage of revolutionary new technologies. We
will promote the peace by redefining the way wars will be fought. |
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President Bush at SecDef Rumsfeld
Swearing-In Ceremony, 012601 |
National Intelligence
Council
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Global Trends 2015 |
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Biological Warfare Threat |
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More players with offensive BW program |
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More lethal agents |
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More proliferation of technologies |
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MI2 Game: The leaders of x believe they
and only they have the antidote to a genetically altered agent. Your job is
to prove them wrong (even if, and especially if, they are right). |
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R. Preston “The Bioweaponeers”, New
Yorker |
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The Past is Prologue
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1962 Cuban (Missile) Crisis = More than
13 Days |
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Virtual War: Nuclear Operations During
the Cuban Crisis , P. Kozemchak , OSD/NA |
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A. Wohlstetter, R. Wohlstetter On
Controlling the Risks in Cuba, RAND and IISS Paper |
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ARPA / DNA Long-Range R&D Program (Lukasik,
Haas) |
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1973 US 6th Fleet vs Soviet
Eskadra |
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Center for Naval Analyses |
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Schlesigner, Kissinger, Hearings |
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1989 Gorbachev Coup |
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Odom |
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1991 Iraq Biological Weapons |
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Powell, Jumper |
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Desert Fox |
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Leide, Zinni |
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Confronting WMD
Prevention
Options
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Assume: The Democracies declare |
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(1) Any use of WMD against the citizens
of the US or its allies is an act of war. |
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(2) The use of WMD is the last act of
the user. |
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Your Mission: |
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Create an X-FORCE to prevent use. |
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Non-lethal and lethal options |
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Information Requirements |
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Measures of risk and performance vs
ROEs\ |
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pkozemchak@darpa.smil.mil |
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pkozemchak@darpa.ic.gov |
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“All things are ready if
our minds be so.”
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Current DOD readiness reporting systems
(including JMRRs) fail to measure “decision superiority” of our commanders,
value of information to warfighters |
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Joint Vision 2020 and GPRA |
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Is a 12-hour restoration time for
mission-critical networks in “national security emergencies” the best we can do? |
What is DOD’s Social
Welfare Function?
The Strategic Review Meets The Impossibility Paradox
Research Topics
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Omniscience (o) and Omnipotence (O) in
Games |
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Quantum Strategies (Meyer) |
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Brams Theory of Moves on Hamlet, Superior
Beings, Biblical Games |
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Copenhagen M. Frayen |
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Hapgood T. Stoppard |
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Warrior Codes in J. Keegan The Book of
War: 25 Centuries of Great War Writing |
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Bayesian Games and Mechanism Design |
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The Market for Innovation |
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Akerloff and Heal on supergames and
product quality |
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Surreal Games (Conway, Knuth) |
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If surreal numbers are the answer,
what’s the question? “Fair fights” in networks? |
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Nash equilibria in large dynamic games
(A. Green, Courant) |
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“Who dares wins.”
Can Game Theory Build
Better Gamers? And Vice Versa?: An Experiment
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“On the Net nobody knows you’re… an
algorithm.” |
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Got game? Get game theory! |
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Create an experimental gaming network. |
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For each game of interest: |
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What’s the best strategy? |
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Fight it. Prove it. Improve it. |
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No published solutions for multiplayer
online games |
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Use prize authority to sponsor
algorithm tournaments |
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Can you beat the OPFOR in Half-Life? |
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