


# A second look at “*Detecting third-party addresses in traceroute traces with the IP timestamp option*”

**Matthew Luckie**, k claffy  
[mjl@caida.org](mailto:mjl@caida.org)

CAIDA - University of California, San Diego

Passive and Active Measurement Conference (PAM) 2014




# RELATED WORK ON TRACEROUTE SHORT-COMINGS

- Significant volume of literature reporting the short-comings of traceroute
  - **Oliveira** *et al.*: Observing the Evolution of Internet AS Topology. SIGCOMM 2007
  - **Willinger** *et al.*: Mathematics and the Internet: a source of enormous confusion and great potential. AMS 2009
  - **Zhang** *et al.*: Quantifying the pitfalls of traceroute in AS connectivity inference. PAM 2010


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





# ASSUMED TRACEROUTE BEHAVIOR




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


# ASSUMED TRACEROUTE BEHAVIOR





# ASSUMED TRACEROUTE BEHAVIOR



**AS path inference: X Y**



# HOW SHOULD A ROUTER BEHAVE?


(RFC 1812)

## 4.3.2.4 ICMP Message Source Address


Except where this document specifies otherwise, the IP source address in an ICMP message originated by the router **MUST** be one of the IP addresses associated with the physical interface over which the ICMP message is transmitted. If the interface has no IP addresses associated with it, the router's router-id (see Section [5.2.5]) is used instead.

*That is, the address of the **out-bound** interface from which the ICMP message is sent*


# OFF-PATH AND THIRD-PARTY ADDRESSES



# OFF-PATH AND THIRD-PARTY ADDRESSES




# OFF-PATH AND THIRD-PARTY ADDRESSES







# OFF-PATH AND THIRD-PARTY ADDRESSES




# OFF-PATH AND THIRD-PARTY ADDRESSES



# OFF-PATH AND THIRD-PARTY ADDRESSES



# OFF-PATH AND THIRD-PARTY ADDRESSES



**AS path inference: X Z Y**



# FINDINGS OF MARCHETTA ET AL.

*(PAM2013)*


- Most classifiable addresses in traceroute paths are off-path
- Consecutive off-path addresses are common
  - More than half of off-path sequences were at least 3 hops
- Presence of off-path addresses in traceroute much more widespread than previously believed

# WHAT MOTIVATED OUR WORK?

- If technique and results from Marchetta *et al.* PAM2013 are correct:
  - traceroute is unfit for purpose, operationally and in research.
  - their technique would help us make more solid inferences.
- But: no validation reported.
- Our goal was to assess the correctness of their technique and findings.



# IP PRE-SPECIFIED TIMESTAMPS



Routers should embed a timestamp if the specified interface is visited

} IP Options

Sherry *et al.* notation:  
a packet sent to Z that asks the routers with addresses A, B, C, D to embed timestamps is written as  
**Z|ABCD**



# CRITICAL ASSUMPTION


*(Marchetta et al. PAM 2013)*

If a router **does not embed** a timestamp for a specified IP address when forwarding a packet to a destination  $X$ , but **does embed** timestamps when packets are sent to the router, then an address observed in traceroute towards  $X$  was **not in the forwarding path.**




# TP-TRACEROUTE ALGORITHM

*(Marchetta et al. PAM 2013)*



# TP-TRACEROUTE ALGORITHM

*(Marchetta et al. PAM 2013)*



1. UDP Timestamp g|ggggg


Port unreach w/ IP timestamp option quoted

If no response, or no timestamp quote, then stop.



# TP-TRACEROUTE ALGORITHM

(Marchetta et al. PAM 2013)




1. UDP Timestamp g|ggggg

Port unreachable w/ IP timestamp option quoted


2. UDP Traceroute g

Infer the forward IP path towards g.



# TP-TRACEROUTE ALGORITHM


(Marchetta et al. PAM 2013)



1. UDP Timestamp g|ggggg


Port unreach w/ IP timestamp option quoted

2. UDP Traceroute g




3. ICMP Timestamp b|bbbb

ICMP response w/ 1-3 timestamps from b



4. ICMP Timestamp e|eeee

ICMP response w/ 1-3 timestamps from e




If no response,

or 0 timestamps, (does not support option)

or 4 timestamps, (will embed timestamp regardless of visiting interface)


then tptraceroute cannot infer if the interface was visited or not.





# TP-TRACEROUTE ALGORITHM

(Marchetta et al. PAM 2013)



1. UDP Timestamp g|ggggg


Port unreachable w/ IP timestamp option quoted

2. UDP Traceroute g




3. ICMP Timestamp b|bbbb

ICMP response w/ 1-3 timestamps from b




4. ICMP Timestamp e|eeee

ICMP response w/ 1-3 timestamps from e




5. UDP Timestamp g|bbbb

Port unreachable w/ 1-3 timestamps from b




Because 1-3 timestamps were inserted by b, infer it is on-path



# TP-TRACEROUTE ALGORITHM

(Marchetta et al. PAM 2013)



1. UDP Timestamp g|ggggg

Port unreachable w/ IP timestamp option quoted

2. UDP Traceroute g



3. ICMP Timestamp b|bbbb

ICMP response w/ 1-3 timestamps from b

4. ICMP Timestamp e|eeee

ICMP response w/ 1-3 timestamps from e

5. UDP Timestamp g|bbbb

Port unreachable w/ 1-3 timestamps from b

6. UDP Timestamp g|eeee

Port unreachable w/ 0 timestamps from e

Because 0 timestamps were inserted by e, infer it is off-path




# CROSS VALIDATION OF TP-TRACEROUTE

- Limit ourselves to interfaces we infer are the in-bound interface on a router:
  - **For those interfaces, what inference does tp-traceroute make?**

# CROSS VALIDATION OF TP-TRACEROUTE


- Limit ourselves to interfaces we infer are the in-bound interface on a router:
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# CROSS VALIDATION OF TP-TRACEROUTE


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


# ARE $a+a'$ ON THE SAME ROUTER?

- Also known as **alias resolution**
  - **extensive validation history:**  
**Rocketfuel** SIGCOMM2002, **Radargun** IMC2008, **MIDAR** ToN2013
- Two techniques used in this work:
  - repeated **Ally**-style tests
    - using ICMP-echo, TCP-ack, and UDP probes
    - monotonic IPID sequence from non-overlapping probes/replies to  $a$  and  $a'$ , repeated every 10 minutes for an hour to allow divergence
  - one-off **Mercator** test (if necessary)
    - responses to probes to  $a$  and  $a'$  come from common source address

# OUR METHOD

- Eight CAIDA Archipelago (Ark) vantage points (VPs)
- Each obtained 10K traceroutes to **responding** destinations chosen at random from ISI Census data
  - for each hop, classify as on- or off-path using **tp-traceroute** (Marchetta *et al.*) technique
  - for each link, infer if point-to-point (our cross-validation) using **prefixscan** in scamper







# OUR DATA

- 197,335 IP-level links
- 81,315 inferred point-to-point IP links (**interface B on-path**)
  - In our data, between 77.1% and 90.0% of interfaces in traceroute on point-to-point links were classified by tp-traceroute **as off-path**

**Pre-specified IP Timestamps are an unreliable primitive to determine if an address is on- or off-path**



# WHAT FRACTION OF INTERFACES IN TRACEROUTE ARE IN-BOUND?



For 7 of 8 VPs, more than half of the interfaces observed in a traceroute were in-bound.

**Lower-bound:** these are just the routers we could resolve for aliases.




# LIMITATION

*(multiple point-to-point links can exist between routers, and the address observed in traceroute might be off-path)*



# LIMITATION


*(multiple point-to-point links can exist between routers, and the address observed in traceroute might be off-path)*






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
# SUMMARY

- Traceroute has an important role in overcoming the visibility issue of AS topology data because we have no other way of uncovering some peerings.
- Traceroute-derived AS paths are messy to work with due to artifacts in IP2AS mappings.
- Presence of off-path addresses not as wide-spread as suggested by Marchetta *et al.* in PAM2013.
- Deriving a technique that accurately infers AS links from traceroute paths remains an important and currently unsolved problem




# CONFIDENCE IN ALIAS INFERENCES

- Alias resolution has an extensive validation history
  - **Rocketfuel** SIGCOMM2002, **Radargun** IMC2008, **MIDAR** ToN2013
- IP-ID techniques are generally reliable when they declare two addresses as aliases





# SAMPLING OF INTERFACES




**5.6% of interfaces that we inferred as on-path were traversed in at least 8 source-destination peers with UDP G|BBBBB packets.**

**We are at least 99% confident the previous hop did not load balance UDP G|BBBBB packets on a path avoiding B.**



# MIXED CLASSIFICATIONS



**Most interfaces with mixed behavior appeared as on-path for just one source-destination pair**

