IODA-NP: Detecting outages affecting the Internet's edge

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UC San Diego

Measuring Internet outages is important


to obtain situational awareness

ISPs can identify and diagnose problems

Governments can monitor critical infrastructure

Users can compare reliability across providers

IODA: Internet Outage Detection and Analysis




ioda.caida.org

IODA detects outages using three complementary data sources

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|----------------------|---------------------------------|---|--------------------------------|--|---|---|--------------------|----------|
| a day ago | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| Country C | Outages 😮 | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | G | eographical Distri | ibution 🗘 📃 Ta | obed |
| Overall Sc | core BGP | Active Probing | Darknet | | | | | |
| + ed es Mexico | | tlantic Ocean Senegat South Atlant Ocean | Angola Namibia i C South | Turkey Iraq Iran Egypt Saudi Arabia Oman Sudan Yemen cratic blic of Kenya ongo | Pakistan Nepal India Tha Sri Lanka | hina 0.00 iland Philippines laysia Lucining far Austr | | ew |
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| | | 3AM | 6AM | 9AM | 12PM | 3PM | 6PM | 9 |
| | Thu 11 | | | | | | 9:10pm - April 11, | 2010.0.1 |
| | Thu 11 # Points: 14410 Dat | ta resolution: minut | e 😧 | | | April 10, 2019 | 9.10pm-Apm 11, | 2019 9:1 |


BGP: Detect when prefixes belonging to an aggregate lose control-plane connectivity



Active Probing: Detect lack of ping responses from /24 blocks in an aggregate

Darknet: Detect when traffic from an aggregate of addresses ceases

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
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IODA-NP: DHS-funded project for the Next Phase

- Define the scope of the outages IODA can detect
- Detect outages at finer geographic granularity (such as county)
- Evaluate accuracy of detected outages
- Detect outages in near real-time

Prerequisite: Characterize Outages

- IP address dimension Do outages typically affect addresses from the same /24 block?
- Geographic dimension How are the addresses affected by an outage related by geography?
- Time dimension How long do outages last?

Existing systems allow only partial characterization

- Detecting Internet outages requires broad measurements
- Existing systems deal with this challenge by taking a top-down approach
 - They have some expectations about how outages will occur
 - They design systems to capture these outages

Existing systems allow only partial characterization

- Trinocular looks for outages that span an entire /24 block
- Thunderping detects outages occurring during times of predicted severe weather
- IMC '18 work using CDN logs focuses upon detecting outages that last a full calendar hour
- IODA detects outages using the network telescope when many addresses in an aggregate stop contacting it

Measurements with active probes have evolved since the early 2010s

- Trinocular and Thunderping probe conservatively
- Recent work with active probing suggests we can be less conservative

Characterize outages using active probes but with minimal assumptions

- Some addresses should respond to active probes
- Outages will last at least X minutes •

Towards a better understanding of outages

1. Measure broadly:

- Probe all addresses
- Probe regularly

3. Characterize outages along: 4. Correlate with related data IP dimension sources:

- Geographic dimension
- Time dimension

2. Handle noise:

- Addresses can "fail" due to user action
- Use statistical tests to discard noise

- Weather data
- Power outage data

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Simultaneous outages could occur due to a common cause

An individual outage is hard to interpret

Common underlying cause would result in simultaneous outages



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


We thus identify simultaneous outages that are statistically unlikely





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Binomial distribution gives the probability that D independent outages occur

Pr[D independent outag

- N: # addresses in a bin of time that can potentially experience an outage
- address in a bin of time

$$[es] = \binom{N}{D} \cdot P_d^D (1 - P_d)^{N-D}$$

• P_d : Probability of independent outages of an

Apply the Binomial test to identify statistically unlikely events

Pr[D independent outag

- We find D_{min} such that D_{min} or more independent outages occur with very small probability
- Proof by contradiction to find dependent events:
 - If D_{min} or more outages occur, the outages are highly likely to be dependent


$$[es] = {\binom{N}{D}} \cdot P_d^D (1 - P_d)^{N-D}$$

Proof of concept on the Thunderping dataset [PAM '19]

- Applied the binomial test to identify statistically unlikely outages of multiple addresses
- Studied their properties
 - The majority of dependent outages recover within an hour
 - They often do not affect entire /24 address blocks

Geographic neighbors aren't necessarily neighbors in the address space





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Measure broadly: Zeusping

- We expect to ping ~150M ping-responsive addresses in the U.S.
 - Each address will be pinged from 3 vantage points, once every 10 minutes
 - Each address will receive 432 pings a day
 - Total pings that will be sent in a day: 65 Billion
- We are investigating which infrastructure to run these measurements from
 - Ideally, we would have tens of vantage points and probing volume is spread across them

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Backup Slides

Comparison with related work

| Prior Work | Failure Scale | Min Failure Duration | Scale | |
|-----------------|--|-------------------------|--------------------------|--|
| IODA | Detects "macroscopic" (at the moment) | 10 minutes | Internet- wide | |
| Trinocular | Detects when most addresses in a /24 are disrupted | 11 minutes | Internet- wide | |
| Richter et. al. | Detects when majority of active addresses in a /24 are disrupted | 60 minutes | Internet- wide | |
| Disco | Detects bursts of RIPE Atlas probe disconnects | O(seconds) | 10,000 probes | |
| Thunderping | Detects when a few individual addresses are disrupted | 11 minutes | 50,000 U.S. addresses | |
| | 24 | | | |