Bare-Bones Measurement Data Archiving

Dave Plonka
University of Wisconsin – Madison
DoIT & WAIL

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Overview

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Our Data

Passive:

- ñ Exported flow data
- ñ SNMP-gathered measurement data

Active:

- ñ Some traceroute and ping-like text output
- ñ "show ip bgp" (from routeviews, campus routers)

Flow data:

- ñ Packet-sampled flow records from Juniper Varying sample rates, varying regularity
- ñ Non-sampled flow-data from Ciscos Sometimes lossy, always voluminous

Archiving

Short-term:

- ñ "raw" (binary) flow files, sometimes compressed
- ñ Random access to five-minute interval, sequential access to (unpredictably) ordered flows there-in
- n Usually retain for only 5-14 days (why? It's for operational use, storage space limited, open records law.. hmm.)

Long-term:

- ñ Round-Robin Database (RRD) files
- ñ Occasionally copy raw flow files to tape for specific studies

Namespace

We have used a directory hierarchy with "reversed" DNS of hostnames of the exporters or observation points:

ñ edu/wisc/net/r-peer/...

Complication: names in this space must change when anonymization is performed. One method is to create a script of shell commands (that is anonymized with the data) that will rename them

Afterward, eg.:

ñ mv 10\.42\.69\.10_log.txt 10.42.60.10_log.txt

Annotations

We (ok, I) create detailed README files (!) in each directory containing the data.

We maintain a journal / log of events, as "events.txt":

- ñ eg. 2004/06/03 1600 something happened thru 1730
- ñ These events are web browsable using RRGrapher

Flow file naming convention:

- ñ {collector}.{date}.{time}{TZ}[_{encoding}.{fmt}]
- ñ ft-v05.20040603.160000+0500_tcpdpriv-A50.cflow
- ñ ft-v05.20040603.160000+0500

Encoding / Anonymization / Obfuscation

ip2anonip: simple filter for CSV files

Pros:

- ñ People (and flow-{export,import}) grok CSV
- ñ Easy to add arbitrary field rewrites (such as aut-num, ifIndex, etc.)

Cons:

- ñ Performance: hours to prep a day-long flow data set
- ñ Tedious:
 - one way to get it right, lots of ways to get it wrong encode, examine, correct, repeat
- ñ Result depends on order of IPv4 addresses in input
- ñ Known attacks... better to use CryptoPAN?

Access and Usage Policy

Tried NLANR/CAIDA? model c. years ago:

- ñ Usage agreement document, recipient signs-off
- ñ Data (and therefore analysis) resides on central server

In theory: release as little as possible, but no less

ñ Ask researcher to "apply" for access by describing the project

In practice: increased levels of access with improved (trust) relationships between researcher and practitioner (creator/archiver).

ñ The older the data the better (safer to release)?

Result (IMO): minimally successful, timeconsuming, not scalable

Thoughts

Useful to store multiple encodings of same data:

- ñ Anonymized version more accessible than original
- ñ Follow-up questions can be asked of privileged users

Canonicalize network element names (data set names?) in parallel with encoding:

```
r-peer.net.wisc.edu => border.our.domain
r-cssc-b280c-1-core.net.wisc.edu => core.our.domain
```

We often find an anomaly in sampled data then drill-down into the non-sampled data based on point in time. Can this be accommodated in UI?

Tools

```
Flow-tools: flow-import, flow-export, flow-stat perl: Cflow.pm (mnemonic: "See flow [data]")

http://net.doit.wisc.edu/~plonka/Cflow/

ñ flowdumper
```

Visualization (browse by annotations):

n RRGrapher (browser for RRDs)
http://net.doit.wisc.edu/~plonka/RRGrapher/

Anonymization:

```
    ñ ip2hostname: 10.42.69.10 => host1.our.domain
    http://net.doit.wisc.edu/~plonka/ip2hostname/
    ñ Ip2anonip -A50: 10.42.69.10 => n.x.y.z
```

http://net.doit.wisc.edu/~plonka/ip2anonip/