DNS Privacy in Practice and Preparation

BY

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Domain Name System (DNS) Review

- DNS typically runs over UDP (original standard)
- Recursive resolver follows answers from Authoritative servers



DNS Dangers

- UDP has no security measures
- Vulnerable to eavesdropping, modifications, spoofing (DDoS), etc.
- Easy to use for filtering and logging



DNS Security Measures

Authenticity – Ensuring answer is correct

- DNSSEC

Confidentiality – Ensuring a connection is private

- **DNS over TLS (DoT)**
- **DNS over HTTPS (DoH)**
- DNS over DTLS
- DNS over QUIC
- DNSCrypt

DNS over TLS (2016)

- Transmit DNS queries over TLS
  - Optionally, verify server certificate is trusted
  - After handshake, everything is encrypted with shared session key
- Uses dedicated port 853
- Once handshake is complete, send queries like normal



Image from hpbn.co

DNS over HTTPS (2018)

- Send queries like normal web traffic (port 443)
  - Harder to block/detect as a result
  - Easier to implement for applications
- Use either GET or POST requests
  - POST: include wire format message in body
  - GET: include wire format message encoded in Base64url as a URL parameter

```
:method = POST
   :scheme = https
   :authority = dnsserver.example.net
   :path = /dns-query
   accept = application/dns-message
   content-type = application/dns-message
   content-length = 33

   <33 bytes represented by the following hex encoding>
   00 00 01 00 00 01 00 00  00 00 00 00 03 77 77 77
   07 65 78 61 6d 70 6c 65  03 63 6f 6d 00 00 01 00
   01
```

```
:method = GET
   :scheme = https
   :authority = dnsserver.example.net
   :path = /dns-query?
     dns=AAABAAABAAAAAAAAA3d3dwdleGFtcGxlA2NvbQAAAQAB
   accept = application/dns-message
```

Examples from RFC in HTTP2 format

DoT and DoH Resolver Results

- **1,197,794** open resolvers
- **1,747** (0.15%) IPs responded to DoT
  - 1,529 of those from a single entity, CleanBrowsing
  - 87 unique autonomous systems
- **9** IPs responded over DoH
  - All owned by Quad9 or Cloudflare
  - More up-to-date sources list 35 public DoH resolvers



TLS Related Results

- **22** unique certificate signers were observed
  - GoDaddy and Let's Encrypt were most popular
- **11** certificates were self-signed (Issuer matched Subject)

- **79** (4.5%) IPs supported TLS 1.3
  - Important for reduced RTT (2→1) and potential for 0–RTT
- **1,701** (97%) IPs supported TLS 1.2
- **80** IPs did not support TLS 1 or TLS 1.1

DoT Authoritative Results

- Limited scope to nameservers for top 5K Alexa sites and all TLDS (1,530)
  - **6,817** unique IP addresses for TLDS
  - **10,214** unique IP addresses for Alexa Sites

- No TLD responded over DoT
- **12** Alexa IPs responded over DoT
  - All IPs that responded were owned by Facebook
  - Corroborates with Cloudflare blog experimenting with DoT to Facebook



TCP Fast Open Overview (2014)

- A major drawback of security is increased delay
- TFO fixes this in subsequent connections
  - Server gives client cookie in first connection
  - Client can reconnect with cookie + data in SYN



Image from lwn.net

TFO Results for Resolvers

- **557,969** resolvers supported TCP
  - **10,851** (1.9%) responded with the TFO option
  - **1,257** (0.23%) acknowledged data sent in SYN
    - Google sent TFO option, but did not ACK data, likely due to load balancing

- **25** of 1,747 (1.4%) resolvers that responded over DoT included TFO option
  - All also correctly ACKed data



TFO Results for Authoritative Servers

- Like DoT work, used nameservers for top 5K Alexa sites and all TLDS (1,530)
  - **6,743** unique IP addresses for TLDS
  - **9,558** unique IP addresses for Alexa Sites

- **11** TLD IPs included TFO option
  - 10 of these were Google's
- **5** ACKed data

- **726** (7.1%) Alexa IPs sent TFO option
- **18** (0.19%) ACKed data



TFO Client Results at Root Servers

- Analyzed 48 hours of queries sent to root server (minus g-root)
- **3,769,471** unique IPs queried roots
- **89** IPs included TFO option
- **32** included cookie, but didn't send data in SYN

- Needs to be studied further
- Does not appear the root servers supported TFO



Conclusion

- Both DoT and DoH offer security to the DNS
- DoT adoption is limited, but includes most well-known resolvers
- DoH is newer, but will likely surpass DoT in adoption

- TFO can help reduce delay of DoT and DoH but support is very limited
- Many IPs are sending TFO option, but not ACKing data

Questions

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Extra Slides

Google and TFO

- Google always included TFO option, but did not ACK data in SYN
  - However, over DoT they did correctly ACK data
- Issued 1,000 queries to Google from a single client IP
- Received **80** distinct TFO cookies, distributed uniformly
- It appears Google uses load balancing of TCP connections to 8.8.8.8
  - Selection does not seem to depend on previous connections

Future Work

- Study TFO usage at root servers in more depth
  - Compare 2018 and 2019 data
- Map out Google's backends through TFO cookies and other methods
  - DNS cookies, EDNS Client Subnet, etc.


example.com?
93.184.216.34
Stub
Resolver
Auth.
Servers

80% ^
100% ->


example.com?
93.184.216.34
Stub
Resolver
Recursive
Resolver
Root
Auth. Server
example.com
Auth. Server