


HEAP BGP Observatory


Johannes Zirngibl, Patrick Sattler, Markus Sosnowski, Georg Carle

Acknowledgements: Johann Schlamp, Ralph Holz, Quentin Jacquemart, Ernst Biersack

Thursday 27th February, 2020


Chair of Network Architectures and Services
Department of Informatics
Technical University of Munich





Goal: Investigating BGP hijacking events


- Identify false positives based on three independent filters
- Active research since 2015
- Initial work:
Heap: Reliable Assessment of BGP Hijacking Attacks
by J. Schlamp, R. Holz, Q. Jacquemart, G. Carle, E. Biersack
in IEEE JSAC, June 2016 [2]



HEAP Input

- Possible hijacks
- subMOAS from local BGP dumps and updates
- Published events from BGPMON¹

¹ <https://bgpstream.com/>




Registry Inference

- Legitimizing relations between actors disprove an attack
- Based on Internet Routing Registries
- Historical data available

Topology Analysis

- An upstream provider should filter attacks
- Based on AS paths
- Extracted from local BGP dumps and collectors



Cryptographic Assurance

An attacker does not possess private keys and can not perform successful SSL/TLS handshakes with the according certificate.

- Ground truth:
 - Host behavior before a possible hijack
 - Regular updates
 - Good coverage, Internet-wide
- Event scans
 - Host behavior during a possible hijack
 - Fast reaction to events

Ground truth: Internet-wide Scans

- Regularly collects certificates from HTTPS capable IPv4 Hosts
 - Complete IPv4 ZMAP scan towards port 443
 - SSL/TLS connections to each host with an open port
- Results:
 - ~47 M hosts with open port 443
 - ~35 M successful SSL/TLS handshakes
 - Covering 3 M /24 networks

Alert Scans

- Establish SSL/TLS connections during an alert
- Scan alerts in seconds
 - Only consider hosts from ground truth
 - Small number of hosts
 - High scan rate
- Average daily events:
 - subMOAS: ~5000
 - BGPMON: ~5-10 → ~30% benign

Prefix Top List

Ranking the Importance of Events

How can the importance and impact of a hijack be evaluated?

- Rank events based on the hijacked prefix
- Prefix Top Lists <https://prefixtoplists.net.in.tum.de/>
- Provides a new top list type
 - Ranks prefixes and ASes as important Internet resources
 - Assigns weights based on domain based top lists
 - Prefix Top Lists: Gaining Insights with Prefixes from Domain-based Top Lists on DNS Deployment
by J. Naab, P. Sattler, J. Jelten, O. Gasser, and G. Carle at IMC 2019 [1]

Rank	Prefix	Weight	# Domains	# IP addr.
1	172.217.18.0/24, AS15169 – GOOGLE	0,0178	1039	35
2	172.217.16.0/24, AS15169 – GOOGLE	0,0175	1000	33
3	172.217.22.0/24, AS15169 – GOOGLE	0,0173	1041	42
4	216.58.206.0/23, AS15169 – GOOGLE	0,0165	973	35
5	172.217.23.0/24, AS15169 – GOOGLE	0,0164	775	23
6	140.205.64.0/18, AS37963 – CNNIC-ALIBABA	0,0160	6	4
7	216.58.208.0/24, AS15169 – GOOGLE	0,0154	443	14
8	111.160.0.0/13, AS4837 – CHINA169-BACKBONE	0,0134	3	4

BGP Prefix Ranking for August 1, 2019 based on Alexa List.

Joint Platform

Enable Data Sharing and Joint Work

- Ongoing project to build a platform that enables to share **data and analysis tools**
- Provide VMs connected to a scientific data store
 - Allow collaboration on data
 - Easy reproduction of results
 - Work close to the data
- We share data from HEAP and other work through this platform
- If you are interested in access and collaborations contact us via
 - heap@net.in.tum.de
 - joint-platform@net.in.tum.de
- **We will be happy to collaborate!**

- [1] J. Naab, P. Sattler, J. Jelten, O. Gasser, and G. Carle.
Prefix top lists: Gaining insights with prefixes from domain-based top lists on dns deployment.
In Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference, IMC '19, page 351–357, New York, NY, USA, 2019. Association for Computing Machinery.
- [2] J. Schlamp, R. Holz, Q. Jacquemart, G. Carle, and E. W. Biersack.
Heap: Reliable assessment of bgp hijacking attacks.
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 34(6):1849–1861, June 2016.