

# **A Research Project of InterSOC Cooperation b/w Keio and Hitachi**

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
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# Security Operation in Keio Univ.

- KEIO-NET has 3 PoPs for upstream networks
  - For **WIDE-BB**: 1 PoP
  - For **SINET**: 2 PoPs
- Installed **next generation firewalls** at upstream networks boundary and campus boundary
  - Conducts **application protocol analysis**
  - Separates security zones by each campus (zero trust approach)



# Features of University Networks

- **Research and Education (RandE) networks**
  - Assigned to each faculty and department
  - Basically, operated by **the assigned faculty and department** (due to regard for research and education activities)
  - Information Technology Center (ITC) monitors RandE network traffic by FWs
- **Administration (Adst) networks**
  - Assigned to administration offices
  - Basically, operated by **ITC**
  - ITC installed full-stacks security software (TLS proxy, Mail security, vulnerability scanner etc.) into the Adst networks


Necessary to suppress too much security scan in  
RandE networks

# Keio SOC / WIDE SOC

- WIDE-BB: nationwide RandE backbone network
  - Operational and **experimental network**
  - **Commodity traffic and Darknet traffic** can be captured
- KEIO-NET: Service network in Keio Univ.
  - **Flow info** (5 tuples) analysis, **L7 analysis** by FWs


WIDE-BB  
AS2500

KEIO-NET  
AS38635



# Use-cases of InterSOC Cooperation

- **Vulnerable hosts list** (stub => upstream)
  - E.g., Hosts which have bad CVSS score




- **Darknet analysis result** (upstream => stub)
  - Early threat warning:  
(e.g., the num of dst port 445 accesses shapely raised about two weeks before the world first affected report of WannaCry.

Necessary to conduct access control for cooperation


# InterSOC Modules Overview

- AAA agent conducts access control of gathered info.
  - In User Apps, InterSOC cooperation
- Uniformed format in DB input/output
  - For flexible changing of gathering info.
  - E.g., Fluentd, logstash etc.
- SOC are communicated via **InterSOC Agents**
  - For hide the actual DB from external entities
- User Apps retrieve gathered info via **REST API**




# Assumed Environment

- **Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)** is available
- **AAA Server** in each domain stores:
  - its domain's public key signed by CA
  - its members' public keys signed by domain AAA server
- **Inter-domain routing of AAA signaling**
  - Requirements: policies b/w domains, scalability
- **Ticket-based Access Control System**
  - Access Control List (ACL) is distributed as **Ticket** to each User
  - Ticket contains: Subject, Action, Resource, Valid time
  - Ticket is signed by **Owner** and pre-distributed to User




# User Authentication Procedures





# User Authorization Procedures



# Related Work

- **Access control per content**
  - Authenticated / authorized users can
    - (i) know existence of content, (ii) retrieve content
- **Access control based on multi-domain routing**
  - AAA signaling mechanism on multi-domain overlay
- **Scalability**
  - The num of content files and domains

	Kerberos [1]	Shibboleth[2]	RADIUS[3]	Diameter Inter-SOC App
Per-content	yes	yes	yes	yes
Multi-domain routing	yes	yes	no	yes
Scalability	No[4]	no	no	yes

[1] C. Neuman et.al., "Kerberos: An Authentication Service for Computer Networks", In Proc. of IEEE Communications Magazine, 1994, pp. 33 – 38


[2] W. Jie et.al., "A Guanxi Shibboleth based Security Infrastructure", In Proc. of IEEE EDOC WKSHPs'08, 2008, pp. 151 – 158

[3] C. Rigney et.al., " Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC2138, IETF, 2000

[4] S. Sakane et.al., " Problem Statement on the Cross-Realm Operation of Kerberos." RFC5868, IETF, 2010

# AAA Protocol "Diameter"

- **Diameter base protocol**
  - Exchange AAA related information safely
  - For signaling in Multi-domain Environment
- **Diameter application**
  - Extension of Diameter base protocol extension
  - Defines diameter message format for carrying app. specific data
  - e.g., Diameter EAP App. (AuthN and AuthZ for network access)



# Diameter Inter-SOC Application

- Diameter message: **Command** + **AVPs**
  - Command code: specifies action when Diameter message is received
  - AVP (Attribute Value Pair): stores data delivered by command
- New command of Diameter InterSOC App.
  - Public key Request/Answer Command for AuthN & AuthZ
- New AVP of Diameter InterSOC App
  - Carry AuthN & AuthZ information
  - **Public key Request Command**
    - Origin-Host AVP, Origin-Realm AVP, Destination-Realm AVP, User-name AVP, Session ID AVP,
  - **Public key Answer Command**
    - Origin-Host AVP, Origin-Realm AVP, Session ID AVP, **Public-key AVP**

# Conclusion

- Security operation in Keio Univ.
  - Installed **next generation firewalls** at upstream networks boundary and campus boundary
  - Necessary to suppress too match payload scan in RandE networks
- InterSOC cooperation system
  - AAA agent conducts access control of gathered info.
  - Uniformed format in DB input/output
  - SOC's are communicated via **InterSOC Agents**
  - User Apps retrieve gathered info via **REST API**